Abstract
Introduction
After the United States Supreme Court issued its final opinion in Bush v. Gore on December 12, 2000, most attention to the case focused on its outcome -George W. Bush became president. Subsequently, scholarly attention focused on whether the decision would have any wide-ranging effects on the law or on the Court's standing. In the ensuing years, numerous articles and books addressed the decision's implications for the doctrine of equal protection, public support of the Court, and the political preferences of the justices. A neglected area that has received little scholarly attention is the question of whether the decision and the other election litigation from 2000 would expand the role s of litigation and the judiciary in future presidential elections. 1 An expansion of the role of litigation in presidential elections would be consistent with the broader trend of increased involvement by the judiciary in spheres formerly reserved to legislatures and executives. This phenomenon has received substantial notice in the academic literature, especially in the study of comparative politics.
2 Judicialization is the term most commonly used to describe this shift, highlighting the involvement of courts in ever increasing areas of policy and politics.
In a 2002 article, Ran Hirschl argued that Bush v. Gore should be understood in the context of jud icialization. This, he argues, is a decision that increases judicial involvement in the areas of "political transformation, regime change, and electoral disputes." 3 Certainly, the Court has received substantial criticism for its involvement in the 2000 election dispute in the first place. 4 Hirschl's article presents an intriguing claim, but one that has been difficult to test. The Court itself was careful to identify the Bush v.
Gore decision as unique and "limited to the present circumstances." 5 The majority gave no sign that the reasoning in the decision should or would apply to situations other than the one immediately before them. Of course, as many scholars have subsequently pointed out, legal decisions tend to take on a life of their own and can be difficult to limit as the Court wishes. 6 The 2004 presidential election provides us with a useful set of comparative data to consider whether the events of 2000 increased the likelihood that parties, candidates, and interest groups litigate to gain electoral advantage and solve potential electoral disputes.
There is no question that litigation has always played some role in elections. Our interest is whether that role has changed and, if so, in what ways. We attempt to answer this question by comparing the pre-election litigation from both 2000 and 2004 for all fifty states and the District of Columbia. By considering both the quantitative and qualitative shifts in litigation strategy, we are able to conclude that after 2000, pre-election litigation has become an increasingly central part of the normal presidential election strategy at least when a close election is anticipated. We can also conclude that the parties will litigate in predictable ways. Parties are, to anthropomorphize and paraphrase, singleminded seekers of electoral victory. 7 In short, litigation as an election strategy is likely to play a far more prominent role in elections so long as there are prospectively close elections.
The difference in the political landscape and logic after Bush v. Gore and the other 2000 election litigation is that the political players now perceive the judiciary as a venue of first rather than last recourse. The strategic political lesson from the 2000 election litigation is that preventative (pre-election) litigation is a strategy far more likely to be successful than restorative (post-election) litigation. That is, courts are seen as one of the primary arenas for challenging the rules of the game before the election. At a minimum, the costs of failing to anticipate problems before election day are substantial enough that parties are unlikely to risk a more passive strategy.
In light of the events following the 2000 presidential election, there is significant reason to believe that courts would be more involved in future electoral disputes. The recently completed 2004 presidential election offers a great opportunity to test whether the events of 2000 did, in fact, increase the judicialization of presidential elections. We expect to find a change in the raw number of suits filed, a shift in the substance of the suits from local concerns to those that might alter the presidential election outcome, and an increased involvement of national political actors in the initiation of litigation. An absence of any meaningful difference in these dimensions of litigation from 2000 to 2004 would suggest that no increase in judicialization has occurred. As we will discuss, our findings confirm that litigation as a campaign and electoral strategy now holds a far more prominent place for political parties. This finding suggests that the judicialization of the presidential elections has indeed occurred.
Methodology
To address the question of whether there was a change in the election strategy between the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections, we collected data on election-related cases filed in each state and the District of Columbia in both years. We used the calendar year through election day as our time parameter. 8 In order to collect the data, we relied upon a combination of Le xis-Nexis searches, a review of daily newspaper accounts, and a review of state circuit court filings. 9 We feel this process generated a reasonably comprehensive set of relevant cases.
Of the cases collected, we included only those cases filed before the close of election-day. 10 The filing of suits after an election is dependant almost entirely on whether the suits have any likelihood of changing the outcome of the race. Where the election-day results are close, as in 2000, there will be more post-election lawsuits.
Where Moreover, Flo rida was a natural choice for the in-depth case study as the 2000 litigation there was the catalyst that we assert led to the changes we observe.
After we examine the data, we consider its implications, draw some general conclusions, and make some suggestions for additional research. In 2000, state courts entertained a total of 17 cases while 31 federal suits were filed for a total of 48 cases across the country. Several states had multiple suits in 2000.
Cases Prior to the 2000 Presidential Election
Pennsylvania had the most with 7 cases. New Mexico had the second most with 5.
Michigan, North Carolina, and Washington each had 4 cases. Florida, Illinois, and New York each had 3 cases. California, Connecticut, Ohio, and Oregon each had 2 cases. 
Cases Prior to the 2004 Presidential Election
We used the same method of collection and categorization for the presidential Ballot Access cases were almost exclusively efforts to secure or deny a place on the ballot for Ralph Nader whether through the Green Party or the Reform Party. In Arizona, for example, one suit sought to force Nader's inclusion on the ballot while one suit sought to force his exclusion from the ballot. The increase in litigation across these three subject areas was not idiosyncratic or random. Indeed, the new litigiousness of the presidential election was demonstrably strategic. A narrow vote margin was not sufficient to cause a dramatic increase in litigation. A rich electoral college pay-off was also insufficient to attract litigation resources before the election. However, a close race in an electorally rich state provided the necessary and sufficient conditions for the parties, candidates, and interest groups to commit to litigation.
A Graphic Comparison of 2000 and 2004
We plotted the data in a three dimensional representation in order to show that states with a close vote spread and relatively rich electoral value saw the greatest increase shows an expansion of litigation not only across the board, but more dramatically in those close/rich states. Accordingly, we can conclude that since the close/rich states did indeed attract more litigation, the litigation was strategically utilized.
Chart I (2000)
A comparison of the charts shows that non-competitive states such as California To determine whether we were capturing something other than a random distribution of litigation across the states, we ran a negative binomial regression using vote spread ("Spread") and electoral votes ("Electoral Votes") as independent variables with the number of lawsuits as the dependent variable ("Lawsuits"). An additional consideration of only the battleground states was consistent with our observations. In Chart III (Battleground States), we show the magnitude of change in litigation rates for the eleven states we identified as battleground states. Predictably, the states that were both close and rich in electoral votes had the greatest magnitude of change in litigation rates. Note that Florida and Ohio had the greatest increases. 
Magnitude of Lawsuit Changes in 2000-2004 Battleground States

Chart III (Battleground States)
The aggregate data suggest that strategic litigation has become a prospective campaign tool at the presidential level. Moreover, this shift to a pre-election litigation strategy rather than post-election litigation strategy has also been accompanied by a dramatic quantitative increase in the litigation. However, the quantitative increase alone does not resolve any questions about whether there has been a qualitative change in the litigation strategy. To answer those questions, we consider one state in-depth. We chose Florida as our in-depth case study because of its status as a highly contested battleground state in both elections.
The Case of Florida
By July of 2000, it was clear that Florida was going to be a key battleground in the presidential election. While earlier in the year, Republicans felt reasonably confident that Florida would be securely in Bush's column, polls showing a closing race in the state changed the conventional wisdom. Bush's first ad buy in the state came in July and the barrage of ads and visits from both candidates continued apace until election day.
14 Turnout was a major concern and each campaign brought in up to 10,000 volunteers to assist their get-out-the-vote efforts. 15 Both campaigns invested significant resources in the state and viewed Florida's electoral votes as critical. In the midst of this conflict, preelection litigation was scarce.
As our findings show, litigation was only a marginal element of the election strategies of the parties prior to election day. The minimal role of the judiciary in the preelection presidential contest is illustrated by Table 4 . The final suit, filed by the Florida Democratic Party in late October, challenged the use of the state seal on a letter from the Republican Party soliciting absentee ballot requests. 18 The suit sought to not only enjoin the mailing of any further letters, but also asked the court to order a return of all absentee ballots sent out in response to the mailing without counting them. This was the only case prior to Election Day that involved any issue about the handling of ballots once they were received.
We can conclude from these findings that recourse to pre-election litigation was not a prominent strategy for either presidential campaign. it perceived as an abuse in soliciting absentee ballots. In one of the most contested and electoral vote rich states in what was projected as an extremely close national election, the minimal number of cases suggests that courts were not viewed as a primary forum for resolving conflicts or gaining a strategic advantage before the election.
The 2000 Election in the Courts
The Board all addressed whether and how recounts should be conducted and counted.
21
Taylor v. Martin County Canvassing Board and Jacobs v. Seminole County Canvassing
Board addressed the validity of absentee ballots.
22
In all, twelve major suits were filed after the election in an effort to affect the The safe-harbor date is the deadline for states to submit their electoral votes and be insulated from challenges to those votes. 24 A better strategy in this context simply means a more efficient strategy with a greater likelihood of clarity and predictability of results.
Cases Prior to the 2004 Election
The 2004 pre-election litigation in Florida was aimed squarely at affecting the national race. In stark contrast to the three national election cases filed in 2000, twentysix national election suits were filed in Florida between January 1 and November 2, 2004.
The areas encompassed by the litigation were who would get to vote, how votes would be cast and counted, and who would be on the ballot. All but one of these cases were direct attempts to influence national races. 25 The ballot access cases were dominated by attempts to either secure or deny a spot on the presidential ballot for Ralph Nader as the Reform Party candidate. The lone exception came about after a Democratic candidate for Congress in Florida's 22 nd district withdrew from the race after being diagnosed with a health problem. The director of Florida elections determined Jim Stork's notification to the Secretary of State of his withdrawal from the race was three days past the deadline for the Democratic Party to replace him on the ballot. This ruling came from the director despite the explicit authority to allow later withdrawals. 25 The one exception, Lischin and No Casinos Inc. v. Broward County Canvassing Board, involved a limitation on recounting votes that came about because of election related litigation but also affected the vote counts of an initiative about slot machines. This case could have indirectly affected the national race since it sought a broad ruling on the re-count of votes.
Other than the Stork case, all the state ballot access cases and the one federal ballot access case focused on Nader. As discussed earlier, the assumption was that Nader on the ballot would help Bush and hurt Kerry. This assumption prompted vigorous efforts by both parties to either exclude or include Nader.
In 2004 After the 2000 election, Florida adopted a series of early voting rules that provided for a dramatic expansion of the opportunity to use absentee ballots. 31 By absentee ballots, we simply mean a vote provided for prior to the day of election, including early voting. Because the voter is absent from the polls on election day, we consider it absentee voting even if the voter went to the polls for early voting. For the purposes of our analysis, any theoretical or practical difference between "early voting" and "absentee voting" is irrelevant.
CIO and others, the plaintiffs argued that because of precinct changes caused by four hurricanes as well as re-districting, voters might be unaware of their assigned precincts.
State rules require a voter to vote in their assigned precinct. The action sought to allow provisional ballots if voters were attempting to vote early and were not on the voter roll as well as to allow votes cast in the wrong precinct nonetheless to count.
Other ballot counting litigation focused on provisional ballots actually cast on election day. While some actions challenged strict compliance with some of the technical requirements of registration (e.g., asserting citizenship as well as checking a box that asserts citizenship), others challenged the acceptance of provisional ballots cast in the wrong precinct. Given the wide range and variety of avenues for litigation that can alter the rules for vote counting, it seems inevitable that from 2000 forward, major political parties will develop litigation strategies well before close elections.
Implications , Conclusions, and Additional Research
From this investigation, we can conclude that pre-election litigation has assumed a far more prominent role in standard election strategy at least when a close election is anticipated. We can also conclude that the parties will litigate in predictable strategic ways. Rather than merely filing suits wherever a potential problem may arise, they are going to dedicate litigation resources to states where the resources are likely to have the greatest impact on the outcome of the election. We can also conclude that, while state courts remain the primary site for election related litigation, the noticeable increase in federal litigation suggests a growing willingness by litigants and courts to use the federal system for resolving these disputes.
The most obvious implication from this research is that parties, interest groups, and candidates now view the judiciary as a major factor in campaign strategies so long as races are close. This judicialization of elections has profound implications at both the state and federal level. First, since the federal courts have not only signaled a willingness to engage, but also in fact have engaged in election dispute resolution, the stakes for the parties over federal judicial appointments could increase. That is, as the potential for a juridical resolution of elections increases, so does the import for the parties of who actually gets confirmed to the federal judiciary. This enhanced pay-off potential for appointing only strict loyalists to the bench may lead to even greater political conflict in judicial confirmations. Thus, as elections become judicialized, the judiciary becomes increasingly politicized. At the state level, where the judiciary is more commonly filled through elections, we could see the potential for court elections to become clones of other partisan office contests. As in the federal system, the judicialization of elections may lead to an increase in the open the politicization of the judiciary.
A more nuanced implication from this research relates to the shift in responsibility away from electoral boards and secretaries of state and to the judiciary. There are at least two potential outcomes from this shift. The first is that the courts could act less as partisans and more as "responsible" keepers of the law. The potential for partisan abuses of authority by electoral boards and secretaries of state abounds. Certainly in Florida, there were many accusations of partisanship against Republican Secretary of State Glenda Hood for her intent to use the felony purge list despite its many shortcomings.
Courts, assuming they are more removed from electoral pressures, may serve as a more stable and reliable institution for resolving contentious political disputes. This potential benefit may be mitigated or subsumed by the likely increase in the politicization of the judiciary. There also is some reason for concern to the extent the running of elections is taken away from those most knowledgeable about them and given instead to generalist judges.
In a broader context, there is also the potential for the erosion of democratic foundations. The greater the role of the judiciary in elections, the greater the potential gap between the desiderata of democracy and electoral outcomes. That is, having appointed judges decide who wins elections has the potential to move the electoral outcome further from the collective democratic preference. However, concerns over the "democratic deficit" may be overblown. In a two-party system, so long as the judicial arbiter chooses between the two major parties, the outcome cannot diverge too dramatically from the preferences of the populace. After Bush v. Gore, few would argue that roughly half the population was satisfied with the outcome. 32 In short, a greater role for the judiciary in the contestation of the rules of the game before an election seems unlikely to substantially erode democratic institutions.
A more practical implication that bears additional consideration is that efforts to reform campaign contribution laws may fall far short of their goals unless the role of litigation and litigation funds is acknowledged by the policy-makers. While constraints on donations for party and candidate advocacy have been constructed, legal advocacy remains an unregulated frontier. Access and influence could be acquired simply through funding legal teams. Recent campaign finance reform efforts such as the McCain Feingold Act may ultimately prove toothless if contributors have the unlimited avenue of 32 That is, since roughly half the population supported Bush, presumably that constituency would not be upset with the outcome.
litigation funds through which to seek access. Finally, these developments suggest that the role of the parties in elections will continue to increase as they coordinate the litigation efforts and resources across the electoral college landscape.
We can conclude that other closely contested states, indeed, any state that is neither clearly red nor clearly blue -the purple ones, as it were-should show similar litigation emerging throughout the year before any close election. This is an emerging trend and one that bears close attention. Additional research that illuminates the source of the funds for litigation, the degree of coordination across venues, and the expected overlap of the legal elites across litigation forums may solidify our conception of the scope and importance of the judicialization of elections.
